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REGULATORYTECHNIQUES IN CONSUMER PROTECTION:
A CRITIQUE OF EUROPEAN CONSUMER CONTRACT LAW
OREN BAR-GILL and OMRI BEN-SHAHAR*
1. Introduction
The Draft Common European Sales Law (CESL)1 incorporates four of the
most important consumer protection techniques that have been widely used in
European Contract Law. Unfortunately, these techniques’ superficial appeal
does not withstand economic logic.This article argues that European Contract
Law in general, and the CESL in particular, are far less likely to succeed in
protecting consumers than lawmakers and commentators believe, and that the
techniques they commonly employmay bring about unintended consequences
and hurt consumers.
The four consumer protection techniques commonly employed in European
contract law are (1) mandatory pro-consumer arrangements, which must be
part of every consumer contract; (2) mandated disclosure; (3) regulation of
entry to and withdrawal from contracts; and (4) pro-consumer default rules
and contract interpretation. Each of these techniques is utilized extensively
and repeatedly in the CESL, but all originate from prior enactments.
The first technique – mandatory pro-consumer arrangements – is perhaps
the most phenomenal device. This technique has been proliferating over the
past decades in European consumer law, but has reached its acme in the CESL.
Eighty-one (!) provisions in the CESL are mandatory: sellers cannot write
contracts that derogate from these arrangements to the detriment of
consumers. The mandatory provisions concern remedies, withdrawal rights,
risk of loss, warranties, notices and communications, disclosure rules, and
more. Sellers, for example, do not have the right to cure non-conforming
* NYU School of Law and The University of Chicago Law School, respectively. We thank
Ariel Porat, Gerhard Wagner, and participants at the Chicago Conference on “European
contract law: A law and economics perspective” in 2012 for helpful comments. Joseph Eno
provided excellent research assistance. Bar-Gill gratefully acknowledges the financial support
of the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund at NYU School of Law.
1. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common
European Sales Law, COM (2011)635 final, Annex I: Common European Sales Law
(hereinafter we refer to Annex I as “CESL” and to the entire proposal for a regulation as
“Regulation”).
Common Market Law Review 50: 109–126, 2013.
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performance, and buyers have a non-disclaimable right to reject
non-conforming goods for two years.
We argue thatmany of these rules are unlikely to help consumers as a group.
The ex post pro-consumer arrangements will be priced ex ante. Consumers
will thus pay for protections that many of them would rather waive for a
discount. This price effect is particularly disturbing when it is regressive –
namely, when all consumers pay for what only the more sophisticated ones
enjoy. Ironically, when the price effect is regressive, a wholesale inclusion of
mandatory terms undermines rather than promotes “social justice” concerns,
which intend to protect weaker consumers and secure their access to the
markets.2 More fundamentally, we argue that many of the mandatory
arrangements lack an a priori welfare-enhancing justification, because they
are not responding to a systematic market failure or to a systematic
redistributive problem.
The second common technique is, unsurprisingly, mandated disclosure.
This is a standard staple of consumer protection: give people information to
help them make better autonomous choices. “Sunlight is the best of
disinfectants,” as the truism goes. Unfortunately, the types of disclosures that
consumers are accorded, nicely illustrated by the CESL’s novel mandates, are
likely futile. These disclosures are neither read nor used, and they are beyond
most people’s interest or understanding.While novel approaches to “targeted”
disclosure are being experimented with elsewhere (including in the U.K., for
instance), the conventional European disclosure paradigm reproduces archaic
templates that have consistently and irreparably failed.
The third technique is the regulation of entry to, and withdrawal from,
consumer contracts. Entry regulations help consumers make deliberate,
conscious choices, tailored for their needs. Withdrawal regulations help them
correct poor choices without bearing any pecuniary fine. Here, too, various
European laws take a sensible starting point but leverage it to an extent that is
unjustified and is likely to be either ineffective or harmful. The regulation of
conscious entry is merely another form of disclosure, and the regulation of
withdrawal takes a practice that is already prevailing in markets and imposes
it in contexts where it might be too costly to consumers.
The fourth and final regulatory technique is the supplementation of
incomplete contracts with pro-consumer default arrangements. We find less
use of this device in Europe compared to the U.S. for the simple reason that
many arrangements that operate as gap-fillers in the U.S. are accorded
mandatory status in Europe. But, interestingly, in the CESL for example, the
few pro-consumer default rules are bolstered by “stickiness”. Parties can opt
2. Micklitz (Ed.), The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law (Edward
Elgar, 2011), p. 37.
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out, but the procedure for these opt-outs is more rigorous and costly. While
sticky default options are a growing trend in consumer protection law – a
strategy designed to slow down wholesale boilerplate opt-outs – we argue that
opt-out regulation in the form adopted in the CESL is unlikely to generate any
benefit, and may impose unnecessary cost. A related technique, directing
courts to interpret ambiguous contract terms in pro-consumer fashion, is also
likely to increase transactions costs without providing substantial benefits.
The next four sections examine each of the four methods in more detail.We
do not take issue with the substantive content of any of the rules. Looking at
particular rules and rethinking their justification is beyond the scope of this
article. Rather, we focus on the methods by which protective interests are
promoted – mandatory rules, disclosure, exit and entry, default plans – and
evaluate the likely effects of these methods vis-à-vis their objectives. The




Much European legislation in the past several decades has created a web of
mandatory arrangements that limit freedom of contract in consumer
transactions. Since Member States vary in the scope of such legislation and in
their choices to go beyond the benchmarks imposed by European Union
directives, we will focus on the set of mandatory rules proposed by the CESL,
which reflect the direction that many local jurisdictions have already taken.3
The analysis we offer is general, however, and is not restricted to the CESL. In
fact, we will pay little attention to the substance of the proposed mandates and
comment instead on the generic merits and limits of the technique.
This legislation features many pro-consumer arrangements concerning
substantive contractual rights, remedies, formalities, formation procedures,
disclosures, warranties, and interpretation. It could have done what many
other sales statutes do, and establish these arrangements as default rules,
allowing willing parties to opt out of them by express agreement.4 But
anticipating that such default-rules would likely result in standard form
3. We recognize that the CESL cannot reduce the level of consumer protection embodied in
the acquis communautaire, which contains almost all of the rules below (in the existing EU
regulations and directives).Accordingly, the critique we propose is not aimed specifically at the
CESL and applies to existing law as well.
4. See e.g. UCC, paras. 1–302; U.K., The Sales of Goods Act of 1979, para 55(1).
Regulatory techniques 111
opt-outs and disclaimers, the protections are accorded mandatory,
non-disclaimable status.
In keeping with existing trends, the CESL includes a dizzying array of
mandatory arrangements – provisions that cannot be excluded and can only be
modified to favour consumers. In thirty-one different places, the following
sentence appears: “The parties may not, to the detriment of the consumer,
exclude the application of this Article [or Section, or Chapter] or derogate
from or vary its effects”.5
In all, we counted eighty-one of the statute’s articles which are bestowed a
mandatory status. All of the buyer’s remedies are mandatory, as are the
withdrawal rights, the disclosure rules, the interpretation rules, the restitution
rules, the risk of loss provisions, some of the implied and express warranties,
limitations on sellers’ right to cure, rules relating to notices and
communications, interest for late payments, grace periods, all the prescription
rules, andmuchmore.6 For example, consumers have a non-disclaimable right
to choose between repair and replacement. A seller must give the consumer a
thirty-day mandatory grace period if the consumer is delayed in performance.
Take-or-pay clauses are forbidden altogether in consumer contracts, and,
strikingly, the seller does not have a right to cure defective performance, while
the buyer has up to two years from the time she learned of the defect to reject
delivery and terminate the contract.7
In addition, many terms are blacklisted – conclusively presumed to be
unfair. These include some of the most common choice-of-forum terms, such
as mandatory arbitration or seller’s home court.8 They also include
“asymmetric” arrangements, for example when the consumer is bound but the
seller is not, or notice periods that are more lenient to the seller, or remedies
that are more forgiving to the seller. Some terms are banned more softly by
presuming them (not conclusively) to be unfair. These are some of the most
common provisions one would otherwise find: limits to buyers’ remedies,
one-sided termination rights, sweeping modification clauses, assignment
terms, large advance payments, restrictions on seeking supplies or repairs
5. CESLArts. 2, 10, 22, 27, 28, 29, 47, 64, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 77, 81, 92, 99, 101, 102,
105, 108, 135, 142, 148, 150, 158, 167, 171, 177 and 186. In some of theArticles, the sentence
quoted in the text appears with slight variations. In a handful of Articles, the phrase “to the
detriment of the consumer” does not appear.
6. Ibid.,Arts. 2, 10(3)(4); Ch. 2.1; 2.3;Arts. 28, 29; Ch. 4;Arts. 64, 69–72, 74, 75(2), 77; Ch.
8;Arts. 92(2), 99(3), 101, 102, 105; Ch. 11;Arts. 135, 142, 148(2), 150(2), 158, 167; Ch. 16.3;
Ch. 17; Art. 186.
7. Ibid., Art. 106(3)(b); Art. 111(1); Art. 135(1)(2); Art. 155(3); Art. 106(3); Art. 84(j);
Art. 179.
8. Ibid., Art. 84(d).
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from third parties, bundling separate goods and services, or setting a
contract’s duration to exceed one year.
In this cornucopia of mandatory protections, it is important to remember
which elements of the contract are notmandatory.The “main subject matter of
the contract” and the price are excluded from the unfairness tests, and are
binding even if set unilaterally by the seller.9 Surely, subjecting quality and
price to mandatory restrictions would deal a fatal blow to any notion of
freedom of contract, and even the most ambitious statutes honour the parties’
freedom to agree on any quality and price, even if such agreements reflect
harsh bargaining realities.
2.2. Discussion
It is tempting to think that a pro-consumer mandatory regime would benefit
consumers. All else equal, consumers are better off with more favourable
provisions. But all else is not equal. Consumer protection comes at a price.
Pro-consumer terms that actually constrain and change sellers’ behaviour
raise sellers’ costs, and sellers will pass on (at least some of) these increased
costs to consumers in the form of higher prices.10 Recall, the CESL preserves
freedom of contract with respect to price.
Of course, higher prices are not inherently bad. Consumers may prefer
high-quality products with a high level of consumer protection, even if these
high-quality, protection-intensive products cost more. But consumers might
also prefer to pay a lower price and get lower quality products with a lower
level of consumer protection. People often waive warranty programmes, buy
non-refundable items, choose slower delivery options, or decline to insure,
because it makes the product cheaper.A thirty-day grace period, or a generous
remedy, or an easy no-questions-asked termination option, are surely
beneficial to consumers, but they are also costly to sellers, resulting in higher
prices. If most consumers prefer these perks, sellers would offer them and lure
consumerswith them.The fact that they do not – and the fact that the law needs
to mandate them – suggests that most consumers prefer the discount
(assuming that consumers are sufficiently sophisticated).
The preceding discussion lumps all consumers together, asking whether
consumers as a group would benefit from strong protections once these
protections are priced. But consumers are a heterogeneous group, with
different preferences and different budgets. Indeed, heterogeneity of
9. Ibid., Art. 80(2).
10. See, e.g., Posner, EconomicAnalysis of Law (1998); Shavell, Foundations of Economic
Analysis of Law (2004); Craswell, “Passing on the costs of legal rules: Efficiency and
distribution in buyer-seller relationships”, 43 Stanford Law Review (1991), 361.
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consumers is one of the important premises of the harmonization project,
aiming “to grant access justice to those who are excluded from the market or
to those who face difficulties in making use of the market freedoms. European
private law rules have to make sure that the weaker parties have and maintain
access to the market”.11The protections secured by the CESL or by even more
ambitious Member States’ laws are intended to benefit consumers who are
otherwisemistreated, denied service, or left without access. Unfortunately, the
perspective we offer suggests that the proposed protections would undermine,
rather than secure, access justice. While some consumers may prefer to pay
high prices for strong protections, others may prefer the
low-price-low-protection combination. Among this latter group are some
consumers who would be priced out of the high-protection market. When
consumers are heterogeneous, a one-size-fits-all mandatory approach
necessarily hurts certain subgroups of consumers. Metaphorically, some air
travellers prefer to fly first class, even at the higher airfare. But most
consumerswould protest if airlineswere required, by notion of equal access, to
fly all passengers in first class. This is precisely why many people reject
extended warranty programmes offered by retailers. They don’t want to buy
better terms.12
The focus, thus far, has been on heterogeneity with respect to the
price-protection trade-off. Consumers are also heterogeneous with respect to
their propensity to benefit from protections. Some consumers are more likely
to inspect goods and return them, to invoke warranties, to demand
replacements, or to sue and seek damages. For them, the right to sue the seller
in court rather than arbitration, or the right to obtain strong remedies for
breach, is more valuable. To others – often the “silent majority” who are not
aware of their legal rights and protections – the enhanced access to court and
remedies is less beneficial. They do not complain, do not sue, or reach an
“off-contract” understanding with the seller – and de facto waive the
protections. For example, the Eurobarometer survey, cited and relied on by the
Commission in proposing the CESL, shows that consumers report a
preference for arbitration over litigation.13 Since sellers are generally unable
to segregate, in advance, the more vs. less litigious consumers, all consumers
will pay the price of the
11. Micklitz, op. cit. supra note 2, 5. See alsoMak, “Unweaving the CESL: Legal-economic
reason and institutional imagination in European contract law” (in this volume).
12. Only 1/3 of consumers purchase extended warranties; see Chen, Kalra and Sun, “Why
do consumers buy extended service contracts?”, 36 Journal of Consumer Research (2009), 611,
615; Ross and Ahmed, “Extended warranties: A behavioral perspective”, 19 Advances in
Consumer Research (1992), 879, 879 (30–50% estimates).
13. See Hubbard, “Another look at the Eurobarometer surveys” (this volume).
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protections that only the few enjoy.14This is a cross-subsidy from the majority
to the few (and not from sellers to buyers).
This cross-subsidy is often inefficient: the cost to the many is greater than
the benefit to the few. It is also regressive and unfair. To benefit from the legal
protections, consumers need to be informed about these rights, to have the
sophistication to insist on compliance, and to afford legal advice.15 The
wealthier and healthier consumers are systematicallymore likely to invoke the
protections. The poor, the elderly, the less educated – those for whom the
protections are enacted in the first place – lack the information, the
sophistication, and the resources.And yet, they bear an equal share of the cost.
Thus, mandating such a long list of protections is likely to diminish the access
to markets for those who already face the greatest barriers.
Mandatory rules are not bad by definition.They could be utilized efficiently
when voluntary contracts cannot be relied upon to maximize social welfare –
for example, when contracts impose externalities, or when one of the parties is
unable to make good decisions.16 Consumers may fail to make good decisions
either because of asymmetric information or because of imperfect rationality
(and often the combination of the two). A rational, informed consumer would
selectively bargain for the protections that are worth the added price. Less
sophisticated consumers might not fare so well in a laissez-faire environment.
They might fail to appreciate certain risks or powers, and so they might
underestimate the importance of certain protections. When sophisticated
sellers face such naive consumers, the market equilibrium may include an
inefficiently low level of consumer protection.17 This concern may justify an
occasional protection, but it hardly justifies the CESL’s wholesale inventory
of mandates, which are often based on exaggerated ex post concerns rather
than any systematic notion of market failure, and are not justified by any
empirical evidence that suggests any systematic market failure.18
14. Gillette, “Rolling contracts as an agency problem”, (2004)Wisconsin Law Review, 679;
Quillen, “Contract damages and cross-subsidization”, 61 Southern California Law Review
(1988), 1125.
15. Hubbard, op. cit. supra note 13. Studies show a disproportionate advantage to the
wealthy in learning about pecuniary benefits through mandated disclosure. See e.g. O’Neill et
al., “Money 2000 participants:Who are they?”, 37 Journal of Extension (1999), 6; Gartner and
Todd,Effectiveness of Online“Early Intervention” Financial Education for Credit Cardholders
(2005).
16. See, generally, Bebchuk, “The debate over contractual freedom in corporate law”, 89
Columbia Law Review (1989), 1395.
17. See Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics and Psychology in Consumer
Markets (OUP, 2012).
18. There is a different, potential justification for a uniform sales law that is basically
mandatory. In a large market like the EU, consumers need to consider and compare different
products, offered by different sellers, from different countries, at different prices, and with
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3. Information and disclosure
3.1. The Law
The regulation of information is arguably the most common technique in
consumer protection law. Based on the irrefutable logic that informed decision
makers reach better, safer, and more efficient decisions, consumer protection
statutes rely plentifully on two devices that deliver information to consumers.
First, they mandate various affirmative disclosures, requiring informed
parties to convey certain information, often in mandated formats, to all
consumers. Second, they supervise voluntary disclosures to assure their
integrity, with causes of action against deception and fraud.
The CESL, for example, applies both techniques. Like any sales statute, it
forbids deception. Since merchants lure consumers by representations that are
at times rosier than the subsequent performance, consumers are entitled to rely
on the information given, and the representations are enforceable
notwithstanding attempts to disclaim then in the standard form.19 This is the
“basis of the bargain” principle of warranty law.20
More ambitious is the CESL’s approach to mandated disclosure. First,
consumer contracts have to explicitly disclose a variety of terms, ranging from
the most basic (e.g, price, fees, payment and delivery, duration) to the more
specialized (e.g. conditions for termination, post-sale services, digital rights
limitations, right to withdraw).21 Second, the CESL mandates a “duty of
transparency,” which is achieved in several ways. Boilerplate terms have to be
communicated “in plain intelligible language”.22 Many of them have to be in
writing.23 And drafters have “the duty to raise awareness” to terms that are
particularly important – “a mere reference to them in the contract document”
is not sufficient.24 A separate and specific acknowledgement of assent is
required, to ensure that the information reaches its destination. Thus, the
consumer must receive not only the standard form contract in a durable
different governing legal-contractual regimes. It may be beneficial to simplify this
multidimensional decision problem by fixing one aspect – the legal-contractual regime. Still,
this potential justification needs to be weighed against the substantial costs of the mandatory
rules. And, moreover, the optional nature of the CESL undermines this potential justification.
19. CESL, Arts. 28 and 69.
20. UCC, paras. 2–313. See Baird, “Precontractual disclosure duties under the Common
European Sales Law” (this volume).
21. CESL, Arts. 13–18, 20, 22, 27.
22. Ibid., Art. 82, Arts. 13(3)(b) and 13(4)(b).
23. Ibid., Art. 18 (for off-premise contracts).
24. Ibid., Art. 70.
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medium, but also a separate disclosure regarding the right to withdraw and its
limitations (as well as a standardized withdrawal form).25
Third, and most innovative, the very fact that the CESL is chosen as the
governing law has to be disclosed and explained. Since consumers are
oblivious to lawyerly matters like choice of law, the CESL pursues a
formidable mission: “The use of the Common European Sales Law should be
an informed choice” and so consumers “must be fully aware of the fact that
they are agreeing to the use of rules which are different from those of their
pre-existing national law”.26 The CESL requires merchants to use a uniform
Standard Information Notice – a two-page pre-drafted form – that consumers
must receive in writing, separate from the merchant’s standard form contract,
highlighting the law’s “salient features”.27
3.2. Discussion
The CESL’s anti-deception rules are quite standard, adopting familiar
safeguards for the integrity of voluntary disclosures. Markets that rely on
voluntary communications, advertisements, and promisesmust penalize fraud
– for the benefit of both consumers and honest merchants, and to enable
credible sorting along quality and price dimensions. We are more critical of
the CESL’s other information device: its approach to mandatory disclosure.
The disclosure paradigm adopted by the CESL is archaic and likely futile. It
mandates formats of disclosure that have failed in the past, are highly unlikely
to deliver any benefit, and are more likely to impose unnecessary costs, and
even have unintended harms.
The CESL’s contract disclosures are likely to fail because consumers will
not pay attention to them. People do not pay attention to standard forms,
neither long nor short, in plain language or in legalese, written or oral,
separately signed or unified into one document, handed out in advance or ex
post. The failure of consumers to attend to mandated disclosures packaged in
pre-drafted language has been documented thoroughly, in area after area of
consumer transactions, medical “informed consent,” privacy, financial
literacy, and much more.28
Many factors account for this “non-readership” phenomenon. First, the
CESL alone requires a hefty amount of disclosures, far too time-consuming
for shoppers to investigate in the course of routine sale transactions. The
25. Ibid., Arts. 17(4), 19(5), 41(3). The form that the disclosure must take is mandated in
Appendixes 1 and 2.
26. Regulation, Preamble, s.22–23.
27. Ibid., Arts. 8–9 and Annex II.
28. See, generally, Ben-Shahar and Schneider, “The failure of mandated disclosure”, 159
University of Pennsylvania Law Review (2011), 647.
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typical consumer would take home a “packet”: the standard terms of the
contract, the right-to-withdraw disclosure, the actual withdrawal form and the
Standard Information Notice. The packet may actually be much heftier,
because lawmakers regulate sector-specific disclosures to alert consumers to
particular features, risks, costs, and options, unique to some products. In the
U.S., for example, there are sector-specific disclosure mandates for sales of
cars, appliances, food, drugs, timeshares, prepaid charge cards, burial
products, art, pets – and many, many more. And in Europe there are
country-specific disclosuremandates. If these sale transactions involve credit,
or service elements, or insurance, or implicate privacy issues, or
environmental issues, or conflicts of interests, additional disclosures may be
mandated. In this clutter, how likely are consumers to read any of the CESL’s
pre-printed boilerplate?And the fact that people might get the CESL’s packet
monotonically, in repeated opportunities, might only render it invisible,
regarded as another robotic routine – not as a vital information source.
The problems with disclosure as a consumer protection device run deeper,
and this is not the place to analyse their roots. Disclosure mandates are often
written without regard for people’s cognitive abilities and literacy levels.They
disregard people’s reluctance to read texts that are unfamiliar and imposing.
They misconstrue people’s objectives, thinking of consumers as guzzlers of
technical information, not as users of products. They tell people stuff about
matters that most people have no experience with, which require a theoretical
framework to analyse. People do not read the disclosures because good things
will rarely emerge from this exercise. It is time-consuming, dull, largely
irrelevant, and full of bad news. Any dash of vitality that brought them to the
transaction in the first place would be quashed. Besides, if they read
something they dislike, would they switch to anothermerchant with its own set
of disclosures?
This kind of mandated disclosure could be costly and harmful. It is costly
because it compounds the transactions costs with extra forms, signatures,
clicks, and much ceremony. It is harmful because it creates a presumption of
“informed consent” that weakens the effect of other protections.When a term
is disclosed, it is no longer “hidden”. If courts are willing to strike hidden
one-sided terms, they might hold back if consumers are presumed to be fully
aware. For example, “written disclosure requirements, without other
protections, can have the unintended effect of insulating predatory lenders
where fraud or deception may have occurred”.29
29. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urb. Dev. & U.S. Dep’t of Treasure, Recommendation to curb
predatory home mortgage lending (2000), 67; See also Hilllman, “Online boilerplate: Would
mandatory web site disclosure of e-standard terms backfire?”, in Omri Ben-Shahar (Ed.),
Boilerplate (2007).
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This does not imply that disclosure, as a regulatory tool, can never work. If
mandated disclosure is to help consumers, at the very least a new approach
must be adopted – one very different from the more-information-is-better
paradigm that the CESL implements. Effective information tools come in two
general forms:
– Very simple, aggregate metrics that consumers can easily understand and
compare, like total cost of ownership or satisfaction ratings.
– Information that is designed and aimed to facilitate the work of so-
phisticated intermediaries.
If anything, the CESL’s Standard Information Notice – the two-page sales law
tutorial – represents the opposite of such “new paradigm”. If there is a place
formore targeted and simplified disclosures, it is not in a general sales law like
the CESL, but rather in market specific laws and regulations.
4. Regulating entry and withdrawal: Freedom from contract
4.1. The law
The regulation of entry and withdrawal from contract intends to help
consumers choose the deals they want and allows consumers to correct poor
choices hastily made. With greater freedom from contract, merchants are less
able to afflict consumers with unwanted products and hidden burdens.
The CESL rules require an active, conscious choice by consumers in order
to enter into the contract. In an era of standard-form contracting characterized
by consumer passivity, the CESL envisions entry into a contract that is more
active and deliberate on the consumer side. First, sellers must obtain explicit
consent to various aspects, including the use of the CESL, “separate from the
statement indicating the agreement to conclude a contract”.30 Second, the
seller must provide the consumer with a “confirmation of that agreement on a
durable medium”.31 In practice, consumers will likely have to sign two forms
– the contract and the consent to use the CESL. In addition, specific
confirmatory memoranda and acknowledgments are required for distant and
electronic contracts.32
Under the CESL consumers enjoy a right to withdraw from distance and
off-premises contracts, within a fourteen-day period, at no cost to the
30. Regulation, Art. 8.
31. Ibid.
32. CESL, Arts. 19, 24–25.
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consumer.33 The rationale for the right to withdraw is that consumers need to
inspect and try out the product before deciding. Assent is not complete until
the consumer had the opportunity to inspect the product and decide not to
withdraw. This right is augmented by the consumer’s power to reject
non-conforming goods for two years past delivery.
4.2. Discussion
Ensuring informed consent or conscious choice is clearly valuable. But it is
unlikely that the techniques used by the CESL, and by many other consumer
protection laws, would have the desirable effect, and they might impose
undesirable costs. Under these rules, consumers will signmore forms, but will
they read them? Understand them? It is true that one additional form, one
additional signature, one additional click – all these are not too costly and will
not slow down the wheels of commerce. But such costless mechanical
gestures are not very beneficial either. If the CESL were true to its “conscious
choice” rationale, it would require more thorough and meaningful procedures
that would guarantee more than an appearance of choice. Those, however,
would impose a significant transaction cost.
What about the right to withdraw? This right, like other consumer
protections, provides a real benefit. The ability to inspect the product and try
it out for a period of time, before making a final commitment to purchase, is
valuable, especially if products are easily returnable.A right to withdraw may
also be valuable to the seller if it increases demand for the seller’s products.
Consumers would be more likely to make remote purchases if they can return
a product that turns out to be less attractive than it initially appeared.34 But,
alongside these benefits, a right to withdraw entails potentially large costs,
especially when it is abused by a subgroup of opportunistic consumers.
Returned items depreciate in value, sometimes substantially. This cost will be
born, at least in part, by consumers, as sellers anticipate the likelihood of
returns and increase prices accordingly. The effect is similar to that of any
other mandatory quality feature.
Indeed, the main problem with the CESL’s right to withdraw rule is its
mandatory nature. In the absence of amandatory duty, prime retailers engaged
in on-site or distance sales routinely offer a right to withdraw, while low-end
retailers do not. Even Walmart offers a 90-day free returns policy. A
voluntarily designed right to withdraw thus enables sellers to signal superior
33. Ibid., Arts. 40, 42.
34. See Ben-Shahar and Posner, “The right to withdraw in contract law”, 40 Journal of
Legal Studies (2011), 115; Eidenmüller, “Why withdrawal rights?”, 7 European Review of
Contract Law (2011), 1.
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quality and reliability. A mandatory right to withdraw destroys this selection
effect.
In addition, a mandatory right to withdraw reduces sellers’ ability to offer
differentiated prices. Some consumers purchase extended return periods,
while other consumers waive the right to return the product altogether in
exchange for a lower price. (Think of the latter groups as passengers buying
cheap non-refundable airfares instead of the costlier, refundable fares.) For
this group, the right to purchase cheap products is valued more than the right
to withdraw. The CESL’s mandatory right to withdraw will force these
consumers to pay for a feature that they do not want.
We can think of at least two categories of consumers that might be hurt by
this mandate. First, the poorest consumers, who prefer to shop for low-end
products at low-end prices, will be deprived of some of their desired savings.
It is a dubious protection – in the name of “access justice” – to force the poor
to spend money on quality features that a paternalistic lawmaker selected for
them, only to price some of them out of the market. Second, consumers who
are systematically less likely to invoke the right to withdraw (perhaps because
they are familiar with the product, or are averse to reversals, or annoyed by the
return effort) will have to pay for a feature they are unlikely to enjoy, thereby
cross-subsidizing the heavier users of this feature.
As with other mandatory provisions, a right to withdraw makes sense only
if it corrects a costly market failure. Such a market failure would occur, for
example, if consumers fail to appreciate the importance of a right to withdraw.
It is possible, for example, that consumers in doorstep sales make biased
decisions to purchase, decisions that they later regret and wish to reverse.35
These imperfectly rational consumers would not demand a right to withdraw
and sellers would not offer it. Under these circumstances, the price
differentiation and signalling benefits of a voluntary right to withdraw would
also go away. But is this really the situation outside the doorstep sale context?
Are consumers unmindful of sellers’ return policies? Are they stuck with
products that they cannot return? The prevalence of voluntary return policies,
offered bymany stores, chains, and e-retailers, suggests that withdrawal rights
are a salient quality feature. There does not seem to be a market failure. And,
accordingly, regulatory intervention seems unnecessary and potentially
disruptive.And even in the doorstep context, where a mandatory right may be
theoretically justified, it is questionable whether a mandatory disclosure
35. See Eidenmüller, ibid., who identifies the theoretical justifications for withdrawal
rights and concludes that they ought to be optional in the distance selling context but mandatory
in cases like doorstep sales that involve decision biases that are either pre-existing or heightened
by sellers.
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would successfully inform weak consumers of their right to withdraw, and
enable them to exercise a robust re-examination of their purchase.
5. Supplementation and interpretation
5.1. The law
Contracts, including lengthy fine print consumer contracts, are necessarily
incomplete. Accordingly, supplementation (or gap-filling) and interpretation
are necessary. To advance consumer protection, contract law may adopt
pro-consumer default rules and a pro-consumer interpretation approach.This,
for example, is the strategy one finds in the Uniform Commercial Code, with
its buyer-friendly default rules relating to remedies, warranties, perfect tender,
and even the parol evidence rule.36
Because many pro-consumer provisions in the CESL are mandatory, there
is a lesser role for default rules. Still, the CESL includes several pro-consumer
gap-fillers. Recognizing, however, that standard default rules are easily
disclaimed by sellers, the CESL makes them “sticky” – more difficult for
drafters to unilaterally alter. For example, the default rule of “no additional
payments” – that is, no hidden remuneration beyond the main contractual
price – can be altered, but any agreement to additional payments requires a
separate express consent by the consumer. A passive, unnoticed list of fees
will not suffice.37 Likewise, the rules on product conformity, which set high
warranty standards, can be circumvented, but their derogation “to the
detriment of the consumer is valid only if, at the time of the conclusion of the
contract, the consumer knew of the specific condition of the goods….”Again,
opt-out is allowed only after the consumer expresses conscious, informed
consent.38
Contract terms are often ambiguous and require interpretation.When faced
with B2C contracts in various areas, most notably insurance, courts interpret
ambiguous terms contra proferentem. And the CESL follows suit: “Where
there is doubt about the meaning of a contract term in a contract between a
trader and a consumer, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer
shall prevail unless the term was supplied by the consumer”.39
36. UCC, Arts. 2–715, 2–314, 2–601, 2–202.
37. CESL, Art. 71.
38. Ibid., Arts. 99, 100. Contrast these opt-out rules with the more lenient opt-out rules for
business-to-business contracts in CESL, Art. 104.
39. CESL, Art. 64, 65.
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5.2. Discussion
In consumer contracts, pro-consumer defaults have only limited effect
because sellers can easily replace them with standard form terms, at no cost
and without raising suspicion. Mindful of this problem, the law may impose
special consent requirements, but often such additional requirements only
increase transaction costs, without substantially alerting consumers or
subduing greedy sellers.
Consider the “no additional payments” default in the CESL, which
stipulates that sellers cannot charge an additional payment beyond the price
remunerated as the main contractual obligation.40 Opt-out requires explicit
consent to the additional payment term, and cannot be accomplished by mere
reference to the additional payments in the standard contract document. But
how difficult would it be to obtain such explicit, separate consent? The
consumer would simply need to sign her name on yet another dotted line or a
separate form (one more sheet added to the paperwork packet). This type of
“sticky” default is, in the end, just another disclosure. Even if some basic
disclosures are thought to be effective, they lose their value as they pile up.
In choosing to enact sticky defaults, rather than mandatory rules, the law
intends to preserve some room for freedom of contract, while safeguarding
againstmindless opt-outs. It wants consumers to “know”, pay special attention
to, a reversal of the defaults. But in mass-market transactions, there is a harsh
trade-off. Mandating disclosures to inform consumers about opt-outs is cheap
but likely ineffective. Sellers would figure out the disclosure templates that are
legally sufficient and easily direct their clients away from the pro-consumer
default rules. Techniques that meaningfully raise consumers’ awareness,
assuming such techniques exists (can we force consumers to pay attention?),
would dramatically increase transactions costs.
Currently, most consumer sales law systems opt for the low-transaction cost
version of the sticky default. This scenario, in which opt-outs become just
another meaningless disclosure, is illustrated by the Uniform Commercial
Code, which provides a pro-buyer warranty of merchantability along with
generous remedies. Like the more ambitious CESL, the UCC requires that
opt-outs be conspicuous.41 The result: practically every consumer contract
comes with boilerplate language disclaiming the default warranty. The
ALLCAPS font of these terms, which American law deems sufficient to
render the disclosure conspicuous, is an artefact of this regime. Just in case,
though,merchants sometimes require a separate signature or “click” to signify
40. Ibid., Art. 71.
41. See UCC paras. 2–314 and 2–702 for the default rules on warranty and remedies; see
UCC para 2–316 for the conspicuous disclaimer rule.
Regulatory techniques 123
the buyer’s “meaningful” assent to a pro-seller term.42 A pro-consumer
default scheme is subsumed by the disclosure escape valve.
A mandate to interpret ambiguous terms in favour of consumers would
force sellers to write clearer, more explicit, longer form contracts. The cost to
sellers of such lengthy drafting is probably negligible. But since consumers do
not read these contracts anyway, the benefits will also be insignificant. This is
not to argue that contra proferentem is always undesirable. In insurance
contracts, for example, the ambiguous language can sometimes apply to the
very essence of the policy. In such contracts, there is no “product” other than
the legal terms, and thus policyholders have affirmative expectations over
these terms. The pro-consumer construction protects these expectations.43 In
most other consumer contracts, the pro-consumer construction applies to the
fine print, which is otherwise beyond the affirmative expectation of most
consumers. There, a legal policy that induces sellers to draft these terms with
hyper-meticulous care might not generate any meaningful benefit.
6. Conclusion
Our analysis of the four regulatory techniques used by European consumer
contract law suggests that they may be ineffective, and perhaps worse –
inefficient and harmful to consumers. But European optional law may have
another objective – of saving legal costs by inducing parties to utilize a
uniform law across various transactions. Even law that is suboptimally
designed can become uniform and accomplish this additional goal, as long as
parties would indeed opt in to it.
One possibility is that sellers and buyers will choose the optional law if it
increases the contractual surplus, as compared to the alternative national law.
Another possibility is that sellers will unilaterally choose the optional law,
even if it is welfare-reducing, as long as it increases their payoff. Either way,
there would likely be a sorting effect, whereby some parties – predominantly
thosewhose national law is evenmore restrictive than the optional law –would
opt in. Others would not. If most national laws are more restrictive, there will
be substantial opt-in, likely increasing the efficiency of the transactions and
42. Cf. Baird, “The boilerplate puzzle”, 104 University of Michigan Law Review (2006),
933 (discussing opt-outs of property rights); Eisenberg and Miller, “The role of opt outs and
objectors in class action litigation:Theoretical and empirical issues”, 57Vanderbilt LawReview
(2004) 1529 (discussing opt-outs of class action rights).
43. See C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
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achieving substantial uniformity. Otherwise, if most national law are less
restrictive, there would be less opt-in and less uniformity.44
It is beyond the scope of this article to explorewhether an enactment like the
CESL can achieve substantial uniformity in governing law, and reduce legal
costs. In an important way, however, the goal of reduced legal cost and of
making available “a self-standing uniform set of contract law rules” is
inconsistent with the other primary goal – “to protect consumers”.45The more
the optional law pulls the second lever of consumer protection, and sets it
beyond the levels existing in most Member States, the less often the proposed
law would be chosen and less uniformity would ensue. And vice versa. Thus,
as long as the consumer protection prong is either inefficient or profit-
reducing to sellers, the trade-off is inevitable.
This trade-off seems inevitable, but it may also suggest an alternative
strategy for contract law “harmonization” (we use the term “harmonization”
loosely, to imply de facto uniformity in the law governing different
transactions). Imagine a statute that is minimally protective and thus highly
desirable to sellers. By enacting such an optional permissive instrument, the
EU could establish the infrastructure of harmonization, assuring that parties
choose and use the optional law, and priming sellers to grow accustomed to the
benefits of uniformity. Once this baseline is set – once sellers were lured into
this network of contracting under the optional law – consumer protection
amendments could be gradually added. It would be harder for reluctant sellers
to leave the established legal network than to refuse to join a budding network
in the first place.
44. This “sorting” argument has to be qualified in two ways. First, as Eric Posner argues in
this Volume, it is costly to learn a new legal system. To reduce transactions costs of learning,
parties might simply stick with old habits. See Posner, “TheQuestionable Basis of the Common
European Sales Law: The Role of an Optional Instrument in Jurisdictional Competition”.
Second, as Ganuza and Gomez argue in the Volume, it is costly for a seller to comply with
differential state laws, and some sellers might choose a uniform statute that is less efficient only
to enjoy the benefits of a uniform compliance standard. See Ganuza and Gomez, “Optional law
for firms and consumers: An economic analysis of opting into the Common European Sales
Law”.
45. Regulation, p. 4.
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